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Energy Policy: Past or Prologue?
Michael J. Graetz
Abstract: The United States was remarkably complacent about energy policy until the Arab oil embargo
of 1973. Since then, we have relied on unnecessarily costly regulations and poorly designed subsidies to
mandate or encourage particular forms of energy production and use. Our presidents have quested after
an elusive technological “silver bullet.” Congress has elevated parochial interests and short-term political
advantages over national needs. Despite the thousands of pages of energy legislation enacted over the
past four decades, Congress has never demanded that Americans pay a price that reflects the full costs of
the energy they consume. Given our nation’s economic fragility, our dif½cult ½scal situation, and the
daunting challenges of achieving energy security and limiting climate change, we can no longer afford
second- and third-best policies. This essay discusses the failures of the past and how we might avoid
repeating them.
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e take it for granted that when we come home
at night and flip on the light switch, the bulb will
illuminate. We also expect the heat to come on when
we turn up the thermostat. Although we sometimes
flinch at the price, we assume that when we pull up
to one of the more than one hundred thousand gas
stations in the United States, the fuel will flow from
below the asphalt into our cars’ gas tanks.
For most of our nation’s history, we were able to
garner all the energy we used from our own lands:
½rst, wood, then coal and oil. From the end of
World War II through the late 1960s, the United
States not only produced the bulk of oil consumed
domestically, but also served as emergency supplier
to the rest of the free world. Large U.S. and British
oil companies controlled vast oil reserves in the
Middle East. Before the 1970s, our nation’s policy
struggles over oil had mostly dealt with how to
respond to abundance.
We remained remarkably complacent about
energy policy until the Arab oil embargo in October 1973 surprised our political leaders and stunned
the American public. Complacency had taken hold
largely because oil prices had been remarkably sta© 2012 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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ble, or even declining, for decades. Oil
had been plentiful and cheap. Inflation in
energy products had been lower than
inflation generally.
The job of U.S. energy regulators–primarily state agencies, such as the Oklahoma Commerce Commission and the
Texas Railroad Commission–had predominately been to manage abundant
supplies. In effect, they limited output so
as not to exceed domestic consumption.
In 1969, when he visited the United States
to attend President Dwight Eisenhower’s
funeral, the Shah of Iran offered to sell
the United States a million barrels of oil a
day for a decade at $1 a barrel; but, in a
decision we would come to regret, U.S.
policy-makers brushed his offer aside. In
May 1971, when Saudi Arabia’s King
Faisal visited Richard Nixon, oil was not
even discussed. Our most conspicuous
policy involving oil was an import quota
that Eisenhower adopted in the 1950s.
The quota kept foreign oil out of the
country and raised oil prices high enough
to satisfy the oil producers but without
making consumers fret. We used up our
own oil when it was cheap and plentiful,
rather than buying Middle East and
Venezuelan oil when it was even cheaper.
But dramatic change was afoot. Principally as a result of strong economic
growth and rising incomes, total world
energy consumption more than tripled
between 1949 and 1972. Worldwide oil
demand more than quintupled during
this postwar period. However, vast new
discoveries and production of oil, especially in the Middle East, had kept prices
remarkably stable. The U.S. public
viewed abundant, inexpensive oil as a
birthright.

O

ur problems started with Muammar
al-Qadda½. Before he came along, the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (opec) had been an ineffectu32

al and unimportant oil cartel. But in 1969,
the twenty-seven-year-old Qadda½ led a
military coup that overthrew Libya’s King
Idris. Soon thereafter, Qadda½ expelled all
American and British troops from their
large Libyan air bases. Then–at a time
when Libya was supplying about 30 percent of Europe’s oil imports–Qadda½
demanded substantial increases in the
price of Libya’s oil. Executives of the major oil companies, badly underestimating
both Qadda½’s determination and his political skill, essentially ignored him. Qadda½ then went after one of the smaller
independent companies, Occidental Petroleum, cutting its production by more
than one-third and demanding a substantial price hike. Unlike the major companies, with large sources of oil elsewhere, Occidental depended entirely on
Libyan oil to supply its European re½neries. Qadda½ knew that. And after Exxon
foolishly refused to make up Occidental’s
shortfall by selling it, at cost, the oil it
needed, Occidental capitulated to Qadda½’s price demands. This move gave the
majority of pro½ts to Libya, ending the
historical 50-50 pro½t split between the
oil companies and the oil-producing nations that had prevailed since the 1950s. It
also unmistakably and irrevocably transferred power over Middle East oil away
from the oil companies to the oil-producing nations.
Following Qadda½’s lead, Abu Dhabi,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia
also sought higher prices for their oil. But
the price increases did not satisfy Qadda½ or the other opec nations for long:
demanding “equity participation” in the
oil companies, they established control
over the oil in their lands. Soon after this
turning point, the 1973 embargo made it
unmistakable that control over Middle
East oil production had shifted away from
U.S. and European oil companies–which
for decades had dictated both the level of
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output and prices–to the countries in
whose lands the oil was located.
The structural factors that made opec
ineffective for its ½rst decade had changed.
In March 1971, Texas oil producers announced that they had reached peak oil
production and that their output would
begin to decline. By 1973, the United States
was consuming 6.3 million barrels of oil
per day more than it produced; Japan,
5 million more barrels than it produced;
and Europe, 13.1 million more than it produced. The Middle East countries were
exporting more than 20 million barrels a
day. Middle East petroleum reserves were
then estimated to exceed 316 billion barrels, while those in every other region of
the world were estimated to have fallen
to less than 50 billion. With the Middle
East governments now in command, the
oil companies served primarily as their
technicians, sales agents, and managers.
Richard Nixon, the ½rst of eight presidents to confront our nation’s new dependence on foreign oil, thought he had a
solution in turning to our Cold War allies
Saudi Arabia and Iran for support. Washington provided both countries with military aid and encouraged their economic
interdependence with the United States,
hoping that in exchange they would serve
as the Middle East’s “two pillars” of antiSoviet stability and free-flowing oil.
Needless to say, that plan failed miserably.
The Iranian pillar collapsed a few years
later in an anti-American Islamic revolution. And even though Saudi Arabia and
the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf
have nominally remained U.S. allies,
they, not we, hold the key strings in the
relationship. The United States continues
to support and aid these regimes despite
their authoritarianism. If the sheiks of
the Persian Gulf decide to put down popular unrest with the same fervor of Libya
and Syria, the hands of U.S. foreign policy will almost certainly be tied.
141 (2) Spring 2012

Our domestic policies also failed us.

Notwithstanding all the new laws that
Congress has enacted since the oil embargo of 1973, we still have not solved our
nation’s energy problems. For forty years,
we have had no effective response to what
all eight presidents from Richard Nixon
to Barack Obama have called our “addiction to oil.”
When the embargo hit in Fall 1973,
both oil and natural gas were subject to
domestic price controls that held their
prices substantially below market levels.
Controls on interstate natural gas prices
had been part of our regulatory landscape since the late 1930s. By the mid1970s, unregulated intrastate natural gas
prices were three or four times as great as
interstate prices, despite lower transportation costs. In the harsh winters of 1977
and 1978, severe shortages in the Northeast and Midwest led to federal rationing
among users.
Oil price controls were a more recent
phenomenon, a creature of Richard Nixon’s 1971 wage and price freeze, which he
had instituted for political advantage–
not for the plan’s economic soundness.
The president and his advisors had expected the freeze to last only ninety days,
with a short thawing period to follow. But
the plan did not play out as anticipated: a
118-page government report was needed
simply to describe the four phases of rules
and regulations and some of the effects of
petroleum price controls from the August
1971 freeze until the end of 1975–nearly
six years before the controls would be
lifted.1 Price controls produced shortages
of home heating oil; lower domestic oil,
coal, and natural gas production; hoarding and black market transactions; uncertainty throughout the energy industry
and among energy users; and the bestowing of favorable or unfavorable treatment
on categories of buyers and sellers unrelated to considerations of fairness or

Michael J.
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ef½ciency–to name just a few unfortunate and unintended consequences.
Price controls for oil and gas remained
long after other controls had expired.
After a period of general controls, a large
price explosion followed, ultimately contributing to the combination of high
unemployment and high inflation–the
dreaded “stagflation”–that would haunt
the country in the 1970s. Keeping the
prices of oil and natural gas arti½cially
low not only decreased incentives to conserve energy but also diminished the
prospects for successfully developing and
marketing alternative energy sources.
The political struggle over whether to
decontrol the prices of oil and natural gas
proved to be the dominant and most contentious energy policy issue of the 1970s,
inhibiting policy-makers’ ability to respond to a brand-new set of energy conditions. Decontrol of natural gas prices
began after 1978, when Congress enacted
extraordinarily contentious and complex
legislation that slowly allowed prices to
rise to market levels over a number of
years. On January 28, 1981, eight days after
being sworn in as president, Ronald Reagan used the unilateral power that Congress had given the president to lift all federal controls on oil and gasoline prices.
The contradictions of our energy policy
in the 1970s had become apparent: Congress endeavored to keep oil and gas prices
low to bene½t energy consumers, while
presidents and environmental organizations exhorted citizens to use less. But why
would a homeowner or business make
large capital investments in energy-saving
windows or insulation, for example, when
natural gas and heating oil were cheap?
Arti½cially low prices for oil and gas also
hampered the environmentalists’ quest
for a “soft” energy path. The prices made
it much more dif½cult for energy produced from the sun, wind, or other nonfossil sources to compete with fossil fuels.

“For more than nine years,” Reagan said,
“restrictive price controls have held U.S.
oil production below its potential, arti½cially boosted energy consumption, aggravated our balance of payments problems,
and stifled technological breakthroughs.”2
Right on all counts.

A

fter we ful½lled John Kennedy’s promise by landing a man on the moon in 1969,
presidents viewed committing the nation
to a major technological project as proof
of their vision and determination. It is
therefore not surprising that our presidents sought a technological “silver bullet” to solve our nation’s energy problems.
For Richard Nixon, the nuclear “breeder
reactor” was the solution. Jimmy Carter
placed his bets on fueling our cars with
“synfuels” made from coal. Both cost billions, and both came to naught.
In Congress, the search for technological solutions to our energy problems presented another opportunity to distribute
largesse to constituents and contributors. Congress became deeply involved in
the business of picking winners and losers, awarding subsidies–whether in the
form of direct spending or tax breaks–in
such a way that their costs were often unrelated to the bene½ts they were intended
to produce. Decisions about what to subsidize and by how much were, at best,
arbitrary and capricious. At worst, they
were wasteful and even nefarious.
The most comprehensive analysis of
government energy R&D efforts in the
1970s, a book aptly titled The Technology
Pork Barrel, concludes that the biggest R&D
efforts of that period–the breeder reactor
and synfuels projects–were “unambiguous failures” and that our overall energy
R&D effort was “hardly a success.” Only
the efforts to develop better and more
economical photovoltaics for solar power garnered even passing marks from the
authors.3
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The greatest problems have been the
tendency for Congress to place geographic
considerations above technological and
economic prospects, along with a pattern
of boom-and-bust ½nancing characterized by a debilitating mix of excessive
optimism about technological developments, impatience for results, and a process of haste and waste. The synfuels program, for example, favored eastern over
western coal for political, not technological, reasons.
Members of Congress frequently have
insisted on their own personal priorities,
directing funds to individual projects,
locations, or institutions by earmarking
projects. Between 2003 and 2006, for
example, congressional earmarks in Department of Energy programs for energy
ef½ciency, renewable fuels, and electricity production tripled from $46 million to
$159 million, with earmarks accounting
for about 20 percent of the total 2006
budget.4 By 2008, congressional earmarks
totaled $180 million, with an additional
$46 million directed to speci½c energy
projects, including particular biofuel
plants and green buildings.5 Earmarks
that year accounted for one-half of the
total R&D budget for biomass, one-third
for wind, and more than one-quarter for
hydrogen projects. The American Association for the Advancement of Science
lamented that “earmarks eat up whatever
increases there are for most energy programs and cut deeply into core R&D programs.”6 Clearly, many members of Congress have been more concerned with
rewarding well-connected constituents
and contributors than advancing science
or promising technologies.
Federally ½nanced R&D plays an important role in helping identify, develop, and
induce the private sector to adopt the
kinds of technological improvements that
may ultimately enable us to shift from coal
and oil to more climate-friendly fuels.
141 (2) Spring 2012

But the government’s spending priorities Michael J.
have not been set by scientists and engi- Graetz
neers. Nor have government subsidies
been neutral across products or technologies. Any way you analyze energy subsidies, you will ½nd wide variations in their
amounts relative to the fossil fuel savings
they yield.
The “black liquor” scandal is the most
notorious recent instance of the pitfalls
of congressional efforts to pick and subsidize winners. Black liquor, a fuel byproduct from the chemical production of
wood pulp used in manufacturing paper,
has been used as fuel to power paper mills
since the 1930s. In 2007, Congress expanded the de½nition of alternative fuels
eligible for a 50-cents-per-gallon tax
credit to include a wide range of petroleum fuels containing biomass products.
Paper companies soon discovered that by
adding some diesel fuel to their black
liquor they could become eligible for billions in tax credits. Instead of reducing
the amount of petroleum fuel by substituting a biomass product, they added
diesel fuel to the biomass simply to obtain tax credits. The U.S. paper industry
garnered about $8 billion from this gambit, having inadvertently become eligible
for a tax bene½t originally estimated to
cost $100 million.
If black liquor is the most scandalous
bene½ciary of energy subsidies, ethanol
has been the most wasteful. In 1978, Congress enacted a 40-cents-per-gallon subsidy for ethanol used in gasoline. Unlike
many other subsidies for renewable energy that were allowed to expire in the 1980s,
the ethanol bene½t has, until December
2011, consistently been extended at a
level between 40 and 60 cents a gallon.
When ethanol subsidies were ½rst enacted, the environmental activist Barry
Commoner insisted that alcohol fuel
could be produced at little or no additional cost and at a commercially feasible
35
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price simply as a by-product of farming.
Commoner cited a Nebraska test suggesting that a mixture of 10 percent ethanol
with 90 percent gasoline would result in
5 percent better gas mileage than gasoline
alone.7 Who could resist the appeal of
ethanol? It would help small farmers
without increasing their costs and simultaneously produce a cleaner, more ef½cient automobile fuel as a by-product.
By providing large and ongoing subsidies, we have successfully substituted
ethanol for a substantial amount of gasoline. But when one compares the costs of
the program to its bene½ts, applause disappears. Despite Commoner’s claims to
the contrary, gasohol has a lower fuel
economy than gasoline. According to a
1986 report by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, “Each gallon of ethanol contains about two-thirds as much energy as
does gasoline.”8 The Department of Energy concluded that gasohol-fueled vehicles
average 4.7 percent fewer miles per gallon
than gasoline-fueled vehicles. In July 2010,
the Congressional Budget Of½ce estimated that in 2009 ethanol subsidies cost
taxpayers $1.78 for every gallon of gasoline saved and $750 for every ton of carbon dioxide emissions saved.9
Despite their shortcomings, ethanol
subsidies, mandates, and tariffs have enjoyed great political support. First, farm
states are represented by a substantial,
bipartisan, and aggressive cadre of influential senators. Second, the special importance of Iowa as the earliest state to
play an important role in our presidential
nominating process and the importance
of corn to that state’s economy have led
many a vocal ethanol opponent to reverse
that position when running for president. Indeed, every president who has
moved into the White House since the
1970s has made campaign commitments
to support ethanol subsidies. Finally, key
players from corporations that have made

the most money from ethanol have been
exceptionally generous ½nanciers of political campaigns. Thus, despite the waste
caused by ethanol subsidies, and despite
their status as a poster child for poor policy, they became very dif½cult to dislodge.
In the past and today, analysts of energy
R&D efforts agree that success will require
major institutional changes. Eliminating
earmarks is a useful ½rst step; multiyear
budgeting for greater funding stability
would be a second. Congress’s diffuse and
overlapping committee structure remains
a fundamental problem, perhaps even
“dooming the enterprise to failure.”10
That structure, however, is very dif½cult
to change.
Much greater neutrality in the incentives for technological innovations and
commercial development is necessary.
Trying to pick winners and avoid losers
has proved to be a fool’s errand.

I

n theory, if one wanted only to substitute more benign fuels for oil and other
carbon-emitting fuels and cared little
about curbing overall energy use, a subsidy for the favored fuel substitutes could
work as well as a tax on disfavored fuels.
Congress, for example, might either increase the gasoline tax by a dollar per gallon or subsidize alternatives by a dollar
for every gallon of gasoline they save.
Likewise, to combat climate change, Congress might impose a tax of, say, $25 per
ton on carbon-emitting fuels or grant a
subsidy based on an equivalent amount
of carbon dioxide emissions avoided.
Either the tax or subsidy approach should
decrease the costs of alternatives relative
to the prices of oil, coal, and natural gas.
In practice, however, taxes and subsidies
operate quite differently.
For one, the burdens and bene½ts of
taxes and subsidies are different. A tax
imposed on the carbon content of fossil
fuels, for example, would burden the pro-
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ducers and consumers of carbon-intensive
products. It would raise the price of coal½red electricity, for example, compared
to solar, wind, hydro, or nuclear power,
which are carbon free. The tax would reduce demand for carbon-emitting products so that people would consume less,
and producers of fossil fuels might also
earn smaller pro½ts. Consumers would
face higher prices for much of the electricity, gasoline, or home heating fuels
they use (although the revenues from the
tax could be returned to the public or, for
instance, used to reduce payroll taxes so
that low- and middle-income consumers
would not have less money to spend or
save). In contrast, the costs of subsidizing alternative sources of energy would
be ½nanced by the public at large; the
subsidies would increase the pro½ts of
those who produce the favored products
and lower costs for those who use them.
Importantly, imposing a tax on disfavored fuels does not create any favorites
among cleaner alternatives or among
particular technologies. As we have seen
when it comes to subsidies, however, our
government often plays favorites. In
response to a tax on energy, people might
change a wide range of behaviors–such
as turning off lights, lowering thermostats, driving less or more slowly, properly inflating tires, and maintaining their
automobiles more consistently. Congress
would have a hard time subsidizing these
activities in anything close to an ef½cient
manner. It is also virtually impossible to
design a subsidy so that it does not provide an unnecessary bene½t for behavior
that would have occurred without the
subsidy. Some folks, for example, will buy
insulation or a more energy-ef½cient air
conditioner or furnace (at least when the
old one wears out) without any government subsidy. If half the amount of the
favored activity would have occurred
without a subsidy, the cost of a subsidy
141 (2) Spring 2012

doubles without any additional bene½ts. Michael J.
Limiting the bene½ts of a subsidy to gen- Graetz
erally incremental activity is impractical.
But since the 1970s, U.S. policy has been
to subsidize the production and consumption of fuels we want to encourage rather
than to tax the use of fuels we want to discourage. Politics explains why. In 1971,
Richard Nixon proposed a “sulfur tax” to
curb the sulfur dioxide output of coal½red power plants, which had just reached
a new all-time high–the plants having
doubled their output of this noxious gas
every decade since 1940. Nixon garnered
little support for this tax, however. Coal
companies obviously opposed it; surprisingly, so did environmental groups, which
shortsightedly criticized the level of the
tax, claiming that the companies would
pay it rather than investing in cheaper
technologies.
Other tax proposals hardly fared better.
In the 1970s, the Nixon administration
announced that it was considering a substantial gasoline tax increase, but it quickly dropped the idea. Gerald Ford rejected
any increase in gas taxes, despite support
from Alan Greenspan, chairman of his
Council of Economic Advisers. President
Ford also ½red his key energy advisor, John
Sawhill, when Sawhill publicly suggested
that gasoline taxes be hiked up to 30 cents
a gallon. In 1975, the House Ways and
Means Committee chairman, Oregon
Democrat Al Ullman, proposed a substantial gasoline tax increase, but his plan was
soundly defeated on the House floor and
never even considered in the Senate. In
1977, Jimmy Carter proposed (as part of his
comprehensive energy plan engineered by
James Schlesinger) increasing the gasoline tax by a nickel per gallon each year
for ten years, up to a 50-cent ceiling, for
every percentage point that the nation’s
gasoline consumption exceeded speci½ed
national goals. In March 1980, President
Carter exercised the authority he had been
37
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given by Congress to impose a fee on oil
imports, designed to function similarly to
a tax on gasoline; Congress then voted
overwhelmingly to stop the import fee
from taking effect. As an independent candidate for president in the 1980 election,
John Anderson urged an increase in gasoline taxes of 50 cents per gallon, but he
garnered only about 7 percent of the popular vote. In 1983, Ronald Reagan signed a
gas tax increase of a nickel per gallon to
provide additional funds for highway
construction and mass transit.
In both 1990 and 1993, Congress came
close to imposing a substantial tax on
energy consumption, but the motivation
then was de½cit reduction, not energy
policy. In 1990, many observers blamed
Congress’s failure to enact an energy tax
on the fact that oil prices nearly doubled
(from $14 a barrel to $24 a barrel between
July and September) after Iraq invaded
Kuwait. This price spike made it dif½cult
for politicians to pile additional costs
onto their constituents. When all was
said and done, in 1990, Congress simply
increased the federal gasoline tax by
another nickel a gallon.
In 1993, when oil prices were again low
(having fallen back to about $14 a barrel),
President Clinton urged Congress to enact
an energy tax–a so-called Btu tax. After
much presidential arm-twisting, the
House of Representatives barely passed
this provision–without garnering a single Republican vote. The Btu tax then
died in the Senate. The following year,
Republicans won a majority in the House
of Representatives for the ½rst time in a
generation, defeating many House Democrats who had voted for the Btu tax.
In the Senate, as usual, regional politics
inhibited sound policy. Higher energy
taxes were opposed by a variety of regional interests, ranging from northeastern
liberals worried about low-income constituents who burn home heating oil to

western conservatives worried about voters who drive long distances. Midwestern
senators were particularly concerned
about the potential impact of an energy
tax on the international competitiveness
of energy-intensive manufactured products, such as steel and chemicals. The Btu
tax also foundered on the opposition
of key senators from the oil-producing
states of Louisiana and Oklahoma.
Following al-Qaeda’s attack on the
World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, George W. Bush might have rallied
public opinion and Congress to support a
substantial increase in gasoline taxes, an
oil import fee, or perhaps even a broadbased energy tax to fund the military
operations he launched in Afghanistan
and Iraq. He never even considered such
options, however, instead funding those
ventures through borrowing.
Nor has President Obama demonstrated any intention of proposing a carbon
tax, a gasoline tax, or any other tax to advance his energy policy goals–no matter
how strong the merits. On April 16, 2008,
debating Hillary Clinton in Philadelphia
at a crucial moment in their campaign for
the Democratic presidential nomination,
Barack Obama pledged not to raise taxes
on Americans earning less than $250,000
a year. Hillary Clinton made a similar
pledge. Obama repeated this pledge frequently during the 2008 campaign and
after he took of½ce: no tax increase for
any family making less than $250,000 a
year. This promise, of course, seems to
rule out a gasoline tax increase, any
broader tax on petroleum fuels and products, or a new carbon tax.

Given the failures of energy subsidies

and politicians’ refusals to impose substantial petroleum taxes, a broad-based
energy tax, or a carbon tax, one other
major policy option remains: to require
speci½ed behavior through regulations or
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mandates. Before the 1970s, the federal
government played only a bit part in regulating energy use. The federal role consisted mostly of the Federal Power Commission’s regulation of interstate natural
gas; the Atomic Energy Commission’s
insistent promotion of nuclear power;
the building of dams for hydroelectric
power; and the leasing of federal lands
for exploration of oil and natural gas. But
by 1980–after adding many thousands of
pages of new laws and regulations–the
national government had entered into
every nook and cranny of our nation’s
energy policy, with federal regulations
affecting virtually all aspects of energy
production and consumption.
In 1974, for example, Congress required
the administration to set speci½c energyef½ciency standards for thirteen household appliances and heating and cooling
equipment. However, the executive branch
under Presidents Ford and Carter dithered,
and the Reagan administration refused to
implement any such rules. Congress responded in 1987 by passing the National
Appliance Energy Conservation Act,
which not only set national standards for
appliances, but also imposed deadlines for
the Department of Energy to promulgate
speci½c rules. In 1992, Congress extended
energy-ef½ciency mandates to some lighting products and certain industrial and
commercial technologies. More recent
legislation further extended and tightened
ef½ciency standards. States also continue
to be active in regulation–with California the most aggressive.
Virtually all the federal and state regulations of the 1970s were of the “command and control” sort. Congress, the
Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency (epa), and state
authorities told producers and manufacturers exactly what practices were permissible and, frequently, what kind of
technology had to be employed to attain
141 (2) Spring 2012

regulatory goals. Under the 1970 Clean Michael J.
Air Act, for example, federal regulators Graetz
set air-quality standards for particular
regions of the country, requiring state
and local authorities to impose restrictions on individual polluters in order to
meet the region’s goals. (In some circumstances, the federal regulators told polluters directly what limitations applied to
their emissions.)
Throughout that decade, such “command and control” regulations were increasingly criticized as wasteful, expensive, and often ineffective. Complaints
about updating delays and ossi½cation
became commonplace. Litigation flourished, though with decidedly mixed results. Congress and the epa frequently
loosened and postponed standards they
had originally set. For example, the 1970
Clean Air Act mandated that carbon monoxide and nitrous oxide emissions for
new cars be reduced by 90 percent of
their 1970 levels within ½ve years. Automobile manufacturers soon insisted that
achieving this goal was impossible, and
by 1977, Congress had lowered the standards to about 50 percent reductions.
Even this requirement was subsequently
delayed until 1981. epa enforcement actions frequently resulted in promises by
industries to comply “sometime” or
“pretty soon.”
As energy and environmental regulation came to the fore in the 1970s, economists began urging a regulatory innovation that we now know as “cap and
trade.” Elsewhere in this volume, Joseph
Aldy and Robert Stavins systematically
discuss this and related incentives for
controlling pollution, but for purposes of
our discussion, here is how cap and trade
works: Congress (or the epa) determines
the volume of emissions from a particular pollutant that will be permitted. The
government then issues transferable
allowances to emit a speci½ed quantity of
39
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the restricted substance(s). For example,
it might issue permits to emit one ton of
carbon dioxide in any particular year,
with the total number of permits adding
up to that year’s total permissible emissions. These emissions permits or allowances may either be sold–auctioned–by
the government or given away; they can
be used by their owners or sold to others.
The fundamental idea is that sales (or
“trades”) of the permits will operate to
concentrate their ownership in companies that ½nd it most expensive to curb
emissions. Companies that are able to
reduce or eliminate their emissions more
cheaply than the price of the permits will
do so, and then will sell their excess allowances to others who would otherwise
have to spend more than the permits’
price in order to curb their own emissions.
In this way, market transactions allow
emissions to be reduced in the least costly manner and avoid the wasteful additional costs that would occur under command-and-control regulations requiring
each company to limit its own emissions
to a government-speci½ed level.
The most successful use of cap and
trade to date, the Clean Air Act of 1990,
instituted a pollution permit-trading program to tackle the problem of acid rain
caused by coal-½red electric utilities. In
applying the market-based cap-and-trade
technique, Congress broke a legislative
logjam that had prevented it from dealing
with the acid rain problem for more than
a decade. The Government Accountability Of½ce estimated that cap and trade has
saved business more than half the costs
(up to $3 billion a year) of command regulations. Recently, however, questions
have arisen over whether too many permits have been issued, a common occurrence in cap-and-trade programs.
Even as cap and trade, with its cost-saving advantages over command-and-control regulation, has emerged as the pre-

ferred regulatory approach for addressing
environmental problems, there has been
considerable reluctance to transform preexisting regulatory structures. Take, for
instance, the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (cafe) fuel-ef½ciency standards enacted in 1975 and phased in during the following decade. Even though the
automotive industry took enormous advantage of the “light truck” loophole
(read: suv), which resulted in the number of light trucks growing by two-and-ahalf times between 1979 and 1999–from
22 percent of the nation’s motor vehicle
fleet to 37 percent–Congress waited three
decades before revising the cafe rules in
2007. The new rules prescribe fuel standards covering both light trucks and
automobiles and, beginning in 2011, require average fuel economy to increase
to 35 miles per gallon by 2020. In 2009,
President Obama accelerated fuel mileage improvements, announcing that a new
standard of 35.5 miles per gallon must be
reached by 2016. In 2011, he announced
that the epa will issue new regulations
requiring automobile manufacturers to
double their cars’ average fuel consumption from the current 27.5 miles per gallon to 54.5 mpg by 2025.
When the cafe standards were ½rst
enacted in 1975, President Ford, who had
long served in Congress as the representative of Grand Rapids, Michigan (a city
about 160 miles from Detroit and itself
home to an automobile manufacturer
early in the twentieth century), had no
enthusiasm for mandatory rules of any
sort. Furthermore, the automobile industry and its powerful unions had another
key ally in Congress: Michigan Congressman John Dingell, who chaired the key
House subcommittee. As a result, the
mileage requirements enacted in 1975 did
little more than ratify changes already
under way in the auto industry, with trivial penalties for failing to meet them.
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Political journalist Elizabeth Drew of The
New Yorker described the new standards
as “in effect, a product of the Ford Motor
Company.”11 Because the mileage requirements were based on the average fuel
economy of each manufacturer’s fleet,
they favored the small cars from Japanese
manufacturers, which easily met the requirements and, responding to Americans’ taste for larger cars, began to sell
larger, less fuel-ef½cient brands, such as
the Lexus and In½niti. Despite its weaknesses, however, cafe is regarded by
many experts as the most effective conservation measure adopted in response to
the opec oil embargo and price shocks of
the 1970s. That, however, is faint praise.
cafe may rank among our nation’s most
successful energy policies, but it is a long
way from the best we might have had.
Unlike a gasoline tax, the cafe standards create no incentive for people to
reduce how much they drive. Economists
have estimated that a gasoline tax of just
25 cents per gallon could have saved as
much oil as the fuel ef½ciency standards
at one-third the cost to the economy.
Alternatively, a cap-and-trade automobile
fuel ef½ciency regime would permit those
manufacturers that are most ef½cient at
increasing gas mileage to sell excess credits to ½rms that ½nd increasing the mileage of their vehicles more costly. This
would substantially bring down the total
costs to auto manufacturers of complying with the mileage standards. Given the
serious economic challenges that automobile companies now face, lowering the
costs of complying with cafe should be a
national priority.
But President Obama is handcuffed.
Although he worries about risks from climate change and wants to reduce our
dependence on imported oil, persuading
Congress to enact policies to reduce the
regulatory costs of cafe seems impossible. Pledges signed by virtually all Repub141 (2) Spring 2012

lican members of Congress take gasoline Michael J.
taxes off the table. Moreover, despite its Graetz
conservative Republican pedigree and
notable success in reducing emissions
from electric power plants that cause acid
rain, “cap and trade” has become an epithet in our political process, no matter
how cost effective and limited in scope.
Cap-and-trade regulations are so poorly
understood by the public that political
opportunities for mischaracterization
and demagoguery abound. Thus, our
dysfunctional politics keeps us mired in
an inef½cient regulatory structure enacted more than thirty-½ve years ago, while
unnecessary costs to our fragile economy
multiply. Either a cap-and-trade regime
or a gas tax would eliminate more gasoline consumption at a fraction of cafe’s
costs. But no politician is now urging us
to move in either of those directions.

I n Spring 2011, Barack Obama an-

nounced his Blueprint for a Secure Energy
Future.12 The president said he would use
the full force of government power to
regulate, bribe, purchase, and cajole in
order to transform how we produce and
use energy in this country. He promised
to open federally controlled property to
more oil drilling and to expand production of domestic natural gas. He said he
would deploy the might of the federal government’s spending power to purchase
only hybrid, electric, and alternative fuel
cars and trucks as well as to substitute
biofuels for petroleum in military jets.
President Obama also promised government “incentives” for a litany of oil-saving items and activities, including automobile batteries, electric fueling stations,
high-speed rail and mass transit, energyef½cient building materials, and biofuels.
Many (if not most) of the incentives the
president promised will, unfortunately,
take the shape of tax breaks, despite nearly
a half-century of compelling evidence–
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from ethanol, wind power, black liquor,
hybrid vehicles, and energy-saving home
improvements, to name just a few–that
such incentives are wasteful and inadequate to the task. President Obama also
promised to tighten regulatory requirements governing automobile fuel ef½ciency, to extend such regulations to large
trucks, and to adopt new federal requirements for the ways in which the nation’s
electricity will be produced. Along the way
–notwithstanding the then-recent troubles in Japan and subsequent moves away
from nuclear power in Europe–he once
again embraced nuclear power, and he
even gave a thumbs up to that chimera,
“clean coal.”
No doubt looking ahead to his 2012 reelection campaign, which he kicked off
only a few days later, the president said
his energy plan would require “tough”
choices. But he did not ask the American
people to do anything tough. He did not
ask us to drive less or more slowly, to turn
down our thermostats, or even to turn off
the lights when we leave a room. Despite
all his bold talk of policy initiatives, the
president failed to explain how he planned
to pay for his new spending incentives,
saying only that this was a “fair” question
to ask.
The phrase “cap and trade” was absent
from the president’s remarks. This, of
course, is what distinguished his 2011
energy speech from those he had made
during the previous three years. Nor did
he venture to suggest that we should tax
what we want to reduce–petroleum use
and electricity consumption from fossil
fuels–and use the revenues that this
would produce to reduce taxes on jobs or
wages: things we want to increase.
Sherlock Holmes famously instructed
us to be alert to a dog that fails to bark. In
the large kennel of policies that the United States has deployed to address energy
policy, one dog fails to bark–the same

dog that never barks. In the thousands of
pages of energy legislation and regulations enacted since energy policy came to
the fore in the 1970s, Congress has never
demanded that Americans pay a price
that reflects the true costs of the energy
they consume. As I have described, for
nearly a decade following the oil embargo of 1973, Congress refused even to allow
the price of gas at the pump to rise
enough to reflect the worldwide market
price of oil. Today, not one of our political leaders urges a requirement that gasoline prices include, for example, the costs
of keeping oil moving safely from the
Persian Gulf into our gas tanks, or that
our electricity prices reflect the costs of
coal pollution. None is insisting that the
price of fossil fuels should reflect the
risks of climate change from greenhouse
gas emissions.
The problem, of course, is that reflecting these kinds of costs in the price of
energy would require taxing energy consumption, rather than subsidizing its
production. And as our nation’s massive
public debt reminds us, it is far easier for
our government to spend than to tax.
Despite all the costs our nation has paid
in lives and treasure to keep oil moving
from the Middle East to our gas tanks,
past efforts to tax energy consumption
offer no encouragement: Jimmy Carter
failed in his effort to tax gasoline; Bill
Clinton’s Btu energy tax plan suffered a
resounding defeat. We should not be surprised that no American politician is now
proposing that we tax petroleum use and
electricity consumption from fossil fuels.
We will continue our quest for a technological panacea, pretending that such a
search is separate from any need to insist
that energy prices reflect their true costs.
In the absence of a carbon tax or a capand-trade system for curbing greenhouse
gas emissions, the outlook for carbon-free
alternatives does not seem bright. The
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Fukushima disaster has made a wary public more fearful of nuclear power, and bets
are now off for a “nuclear renaissance” in
the United States. Some analysts claim
that ongoing improvements in solar
technology will drive the costs of solar
power below that of coal a decade hence,
but we have heard similar hopes before,
and they have not been realized.13 Energy
ef½ciency continues to improve, but the
absence of appropriate incentives inhibits
progress on that front.
Higher prices and expectations that expanding demand from rapidly developing economies, especially China and India,
will keep prices robust have stimulated
important technological breakthroughs
for natural gas and oil. The ability to extract oil and gas from shale through
hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”–in
which a high-pressure mixture of chemicals, sand, and water is used to open
cracks in rocks and allow oil and gas to
flow into wells miles below the earth’s
surface–now offers the potential to keep
our cars and trucks running without relying on the flow of oil from the Middle
East. And we could signi½cantly lower
our greenhouse gas emissions by substituting natural gas for coal in generating
electricity, if we could only muster the
political will to do so.
In the meanwhile, we will continue to
rely on second- or third-best policies–
government purchases, unnecessarily
costly regulations, poorly designed subsidies–even though, given our nation’s
fragile economy, our dif½cult ½scal condition, and the daunting challenges of
simultaneously limiting climate change
and achieving energy security, we have
never been more in need of cost-ef½cient
and effective energy policies.

A

s our failed energy policy story has
unfolded–in all its complexity–many
villains have come to the fore, including,
141 (2) Spring 2012

no doubt, the opec cartel and some of its Michael J.
members in particular. At home, we have Graetz
suffered from poor leadership from both
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, with shortterm political expediency trumping sensible long-term policies. Key legislators
far too frequently have elevated parochial
interests over our national needs and have
been led astray by the potential for shortterm partisan gains. Our political leaders
have also often been seduced by sweet
visions of technological silver bullets
around the next corner. Environmental
organizations have sometimes insisted
on unrealistic goals, now and then forged
inapt alliances, and been used to further
elite, not-in-my-backyard (nimby) agendas. Energy companies have frequently
underestimated risks and shifted to taxpayers costs that the companies themselves should properly bear.
Amid all the currents and crosscurrents,
however, one character plays a particularly central role: price. Although our government has enacted thousands of pages
of energy legislation since the 1970s, it has
never demanded that Americans pay a
price that reflects the full costs of the
energy they consume. Nothing that we did
or might have done has had as much
potential to be ef½cacious as paying the
true price. The contrast with tobacco, for
example, in which taxes have been used
over time both to reduce its consumption
and to help ½nance some of the costs it
imposes on public budgets and society,
could hardly be more stark. This failure,
alongside quite a few others, accounts for
the state of affairs we face today.
Despite all the laws Congress has enacted since 1973, our policies have always
been inadequate. The weekend following
President Obama’s Spring 2011 energy
policy speech and the simultaneous release of his Blueprint for a Secure Energy
Future, many newspapers ran a cartoon by
Jeff Stahler depicting the eight presidents
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from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama,
each supplying one word of the refrain:
“We must reduce our dependency on
Mideast oil.” Nearly a year earlier, after
President Obama delivered his ½rst Oval
Of½ce address to the nation, setting forth
his energy policy goals following the bp
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Jon Stewart of The Daily Show played clips from the
same eight presidents–all promising to

end our dependence on oil, all offering
other energy alternatives, and all setting
deadlines for reaching their goals. The
problem, of course, is that forty years of
energy policy failures is not funny. But
our history offers little cause for optimism. Knowing our past failures may not
be enough to prevent us from repeating
them.
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